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Abstract 
This study identifies few issues that positively or negatively influence statutory auditors’ independent 
engagement. A primary survey is conducted to gather opinion of knowledgeable and experienced respondents on 
these issues. Score of 1 to 5 was allotted to 5 levels of agreement of each respondent. Mean score of the sample 
identifies overall opinion of the sample on statutory auditors’ independent engagement and variables governing 
the same.  In order to examine impact of select issues on statutory auditors’ independent engagement, Multiple 
Regression Analysis is conducted. From the estimated values of standardised regression coefficients, it is 
observed that a few variables like appointment procedure, relationship with management, provision of non-audit 
services negatively influence statutory auditors’ engagement. On the other hand, other variables like appointment 
by independent regulatory authority, mandatory rotation, maximum limit on total remuneration and complete 
prohibition of non-audit services has positive influence on it. Result of t test for individual parameter estimates 
suggests that maximum limit on total remuneration and complete prohibition of non-audit services significantly 
influence statutory auditors’ independent engagement. Adjusted Coefficient of Multiple Determinations (R²) 
measures a weak association between statutory auditors’ independent engagement and its governing issues, 
while result of F Test indicates that R
2 
is significant. Hence, the model perfectly fits the data.  
Keywords: Statutory Auditor, Statutory Auditors’ Independent Engagement, Mean Score, Multiple Linear  
                    Regression Analysis, Regression Estimates, t test, Coefficient of Multiple Determinations, F test  
 
1. Introduction  
Statutory auditors protect interest of stakeholders of a corporate enterprise by certifying ‘truth and fairness’ in 
the company’s financial statement (Gupta, 2005). With a view to performing a quality audit procedure and 
ensuring reliability and authenticity of financial statement, statutory auditors are required to maintain their 
independence from management (Banerjee, 2011). As per Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by 
the International Ethics Standard Board for Accountants (IESBA) under the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC), independence in the context of auditing can be categorised into two groups – Independence 
of Mind and Independence of Appearance. Ethical orientation of a statutory auditor creates independence of 
mind. But independence of appearance requires an auditor to avoid certain circumstances in the audit 
engagement that may pose a threat to their integrity, objectivity and professional scepticism and make them 
biased towards management.  
In recent cases of corporate failures  [Scandal at Polly Peck, Enron, Parmalat, Royal Ahold, Satyam, etc.] big 
and reputable accounting firms (e.g. Arthur Anderson LLP, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
Deloitte etc.) failed to perform independent audit (Copeland, 2005]. A detailed investigation into those scandals 
and notable researches identified certain audit engagement related issues [e.g. appointment procedure, nexus 
with management, provision of non-audit services, limitations of regulatory framework, influence of monitoring 
bodies etc. (Saha, 2014)] that have significant impact on statutory auditors’ engagement (Fearnley et. al., 2005). 
Although erstwhile regulations in respective countries clearly specified the requirements of statutory auditors to 
deal with those issues, their alleged involvement in the fraud brought absolute shame and disgrace to the 
accounting profession (Bakshi, 2005).       
In this backdrop, this empirical paper seeks to analyse impact of select audit engagement issues on 
statutory auditors’ engagement. Opinion of statutory auditors and respondents from related occupations has been 
collected and statistically analysed to draw our inference on the topic.    
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2. Past Studies 
Independence in audit engagement ensures quality of audit and ultimately reliability and authenticity of financial 
statement. But in reality, it is very difficult for an auditor to perform his/her engagement due to emergence of 
certain issues. Eminent researchers all over the world have contributed their thoughtful opinion on this problem 
with reference to select highly recognised corporate accounting scandals where big and reputable accounting 
firms were engaged as statutory auditors. Their studies have identified certain audit engagement issues that have 
considerable influence on statutory auditors’ engagement. Saxena (1993) in his study said that auditor plays an 
important role in authentication of financial statement. Integrity, objectivity and independence of a statutory 
auditor influences usefulness of financial statement. Chakraborty (2004) in his study recognised the need for 
independent operation of statutory auditors for protection of stakeholders’ interest. Thibodeau and Freier (2010) 
in their book analysed select American scandals and identified few issues that significantly influenced statutory 
auditors’ engagement in those scandals. Roy & Saha (2014) in their recent study indentified underlying factors 
governing statutory auditors’ engagement. In another study Roy & Saha (2014) went one step further and 
analysed significant difference in opinion among several occupational groups for the extracted factors. One such 
issue is appointment of auditor. Ghosh (1999) in his perception based study concluded that management of the 
audit engagement can auditor by controlling their appointment. According to Frier (2005), any forms of financial 
or business relationship created out of non-audit services provided by a statutory auditor are also a major threat 
to their engagement.   
 
2.1 Research Gap  
The gaps identified in existing literatures are pointed out as follows:  
♦ There are limited number of empirical researches in this field;  
♦ In India, studies on governing issues of statutory auditors’ engagement are less in number;  
♦ Respondents from varied occupations have not participated in research studies reviewed so far;  
♦ None of the studies consulted till date, empirically analyses impact of select issues on statutory auditors’ 
engagement.  
 
3. Objectives of the Study  
The major objectives of the study are as follows:  
♦ To identify certain audit engagement issues having considerable influence on statutory auditors’ 
engagement [Refer to Table 1, Section 5];  
♦ To analyse overall opinion of the sample respondents on select audit engagement issues governing statutory 
auditors’ engagement [Refer to Section 6.3.1]  
♦ To empirically analyse the impact of select audit engagement issues on statutory auditors’ engagement 
[Refer to Section 6.3.2 (c)];  
♦ To analyse statistical significance of select issues in governing statutory auditors’ engagement  and identify 
statistically significant issues out of those selected [Refer to Section 6.3.2 (d)];  
♦ To measure strength of association between select audit engagement issues and statutory auditors’ 
engagement [Refer to Section 6.3.2 (e)];  
♦ To analyse significance of such strength of association [Refer to Section 6.3.2 (f)]; and  
♦ To draw our conclusions on impact of select audit engagement issues on statutory auditors’ independent 
engagement.    
 
4. Methodology of the Study  
This study is exploratory in nature. To explore the area under study at the outset, an attempt has been made to 
enquire books, journal and newspaper articles, legislations and other secondary sources of information to 
develop a conceptual idea on statutory auditors’ engagement and issues influencing the same. Some of these 
issues have been incorporated in a close ended structured questionnaire designed on a 5 point scale. The 
questionnaire aims at gathering degrees of agreement of respondents on a particular issue. Accordingly scores 
are given to each level [Strongly Agree (SA): 5; Agree (A): 4; Neutral (N): 3; Disagree (D): 2; and Strongly 
Disagree (SD):1] (Kothari, 2010).  
Sample respondents for our current study have been selected from six diverse occupations. They are 
Chartered Accountants (CAs), Cost and Management Accountants (CMAs), Academicians, Students, Investors 
and Corporate Executives. Presence of CAs and CMAs gives us an insight into the practical aspect of auditing. 
Academicians and students of the subject are expected to bring their knowledge based opinion in the study. 
Investors investing in company’s shares directly or through institutional investors depend on audit report for 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.13, 2015 
 
251 
taking their financial decision. So, their opinion is also important for this research. Finally, corporate executives 
from accounts or finance department of big private or public limited companies work closely with statutory 
auditors and play an important role in their engagement.  
The questionnaire has been administered among aforesaid occupational groups in the city of Kolkata 
during the period of July, 2013 to June, 2014. Out of 800 respondents initially sampled based on convenience 
sampling technique, only 601 valid responses [101 CAs, and 94 CMAs, 111 Academicians, 118 Students, 86 
Investors and 91 Corporate Executives] could be collected within plan period. The data collected has been 
analysed using SPSS 19.0. With a view to understanding the impact of select issues on statutory auditors’ 
engagement, we have performed Multiple Linear Regression Analysis. After formulating the regression model, t 
tests has been performed to analyse significance of select issues on statutory auditors’ engagement. Significance 
of the model has been tested using one way Analysis of Variance.  
 
5. Identification of Variables for Empirical Analysis  
Notable researches by eminent scholars and applicable regulatory pronouncements identify certain issues that 
positively or negatively influence statutory auditors’ engagement. Some of these issues threaten their 
independence, while the others safeguard an auditor from identified threats. In this present study, our main 
objective is to analyse impact of such select issues on statutory auditors’ engagement. Hence, Statutory Auditors’ 
Engagement is the Dependent Variable (DV) for this current study. Identified issues that independently influence 
the DV, are Independent Variables (IVs) of this current study. Variables selected for this current study and 
rationale behind their selection is shown here:  
Variable 
Code 
Name of Variables Rationale for Selection 
Dependent Variable (DV)  
V1 Statutory Auditors’ 
Independent Engagement  
Statutory auditors’ independent engagement ensures quality of 
audit and protects stakeholders’ interest.  
Independent Variables (IVs)  
V2 Management Influence in 
Appointment Procedure  
If management of the audit engagement controls appointment of 
statutory auditors, they could be easily intimidated to give opinion 
in management’s favour.    
V3 Appointment by Independent 
Regulatory Authority  
Appointment made by an independent regulatory authority could 
safeguard statutory auditors from threats arising out of 
appointment procedure.  
V4 Mandatory Rotation of 
Auditor  
Recent Companies Act, 2013 mandates rotation of auditor to 
protect an auditor from familiarity threat to their engagement 
created out of long association with a single audit client.  
V5 Setting Maximum Limit on 
Total Remuneration to 
Statutory Auditor  
High remuneration makes a statutory auditor financially 
dependent on the management (Code of Ethics). A maximum 
limit to the total amount could be a solution to this problem.  
V6 Close Personal Relationship 
with Management Members  
Close personal relationship with management members often 
influence an auditor to issue a clean report without undertaking 
proper audit procedure (Code of Ethics).   
V7 Provision of Non-Audit 
Services by Statutory Auditor 
Certain non-audit services by statutory auditors sometimes 
influence independent review process (Code of Ethics). 
Regulatory pronouncements provide a comprehensive list of such 
services.    
V8 Complete Prohibition of Non-
Audit Services  
Complete prohibition on provision of non-audit services by 
statutory auditors could safeguard their engagement.  
 
6. Results and Discussion   
Opinion of respondents from six different occupational groups has been collected in 5 point scale and a score of 
1 to 5 has been given against respective degrees of agreement for each respondent. The opinion of respondents 
represented by these scores along with demographic information of each respondent has been incorporated in 
statistical software. This data is used for our empirical analysis.    
 
6.1 Demographic Profile of Respondents  
A brief demographic profile of the respondents who participated in this current study is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Demographic Profile of Respondents 
Demographic Profile Based on Gender 
Male % Female % 
522 86.9   79 13.1 
Demographic Profile Based on Age 
Young 
(Age less 
than 30 
years) 
% Middle Aged (Age 
between 30 and 50 
years) 
% Experienced 
(Age more than 
50 years) 
% 
194 32.3 279 46.4 128 21.3 
Demographic Profile Based on Occupation 
CAs % CMAs % Academicians % Students % Investors % Corporate 
Executives 
% 
101 16.8 94 15.6 111 18.5 118 19.6 86 14.3 91 15.1 
(Source: Compilation of Primary Data using SPSS) 
 It is observed from the table that most of the respondents of our current research are male. There is a balanced 
participation of respondents from different occupation with varied levels of experiences.  
 
6.2 Reliability of Collected Data  
Internal consistency and reliability of the data can be measured with the help of Chronbach’s alpha (Chronbach, 
1951). This alpha value ranges within 0 to 1. If the calculated value of alpha is more than .6, we can conclude 
that the date is internally consistent and reliable (Nunnally, 1978). In our study, the calculated value of alpha for 
select 9 variables is .6236 which is more than .6. Therefore, the data in our present study is reliable and it does 
not suffer from any sampling bias.  
 
6.3 Empirical Analysis  
6.3.1 Overall Opinion of Sample Respondents on Select Audit Engagement Issues using Mean Scores 
Scores of each respondent for a particular audit engagement issue vary within 1 to 5. Score 1 represents Strong 
Disagreement of the respondent with the corresponding statement and score of 5 represent strong agreement by 
them. As degrees of agreement are equally distributed across their scores, a score of 3 represent a neutral 
approach of the respondent. In this segment, we have computed mean scores of all respondents. It represents the 
opinion of entire sample respondents on statutory auditors’ independent engagement and issues governing the 
same. Mean score more than 3 represent positive attitude towards a variable and vice versa. Mean scores for the 
variables are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2: Mean Scores 
Variables 
Name of Variables 
Overall 
Mean 
Score 
V1 Statutory Auditors’ Independent Engagement 3.10 
V2 Management Influence in Appointment Procedure  3.36 
V3 Appointment by Independent Regulatory Authority  3.42 
V4 Mandatory Rotation of Auditor  4.03 
V5 Setting Maximum Limit on Total Remuneration to Statutory Auditor  3.04 
V6 Close Personal Relationship with Management Members  4.29 
V7 Provision of Non-Audit Services by Statutory Auditor 3.28 
V8 Complete Prohibition of Non-Audit Services  2.95 
 (Source: Compilation of Primary Data using SPSS 20.0) 
Let us put the findings based on mean scores:  
♦ Mean score for the variable ‘Statutory Auditors’ Independent Engagement’ shows that our entire sample 
has a neutral approach to this issue.  
♦ In terms of mean scores, our sample respondents have positive attitude towards ‘Management Influence in 
Appointment Procedure’, ‘Appointment by Independent Regulatory Authority’, ‘Mandatory Rotation of 
Auditor’, ‘Close Personal Relationship with Management Members’, and ‘Provision of Non-Audit Services 
by Statutory Auditor’. Among these issues, ‘Close Personal Relationship with Management Members’ and 
‘Mandatory Rotation of Auditor’ has very high mean scores. Hence, influence of these issues on statutory 
auditors’ independent engagement is significant.  
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♦ However, they do not consider ‘Complete Prohibition of Non-Audit Services’ to be an important issue 
governing statutory auditors’ independent engagement.  
♦ Sample respondents have a neutral attitude towards ‘Setting Maximum Limit on Total Remuneration to 
Statutory Auditor’.  
6.3.2 Impact of Underlying Variables on Statutory Auditors’ Independent engagement using Multiple Linear 
Regression Analysis 
Our main objective is to analyse the impact of select audit engagement issues on statutory auditors’ engagement. 
Therefore, theoretically statutory auditors’ engagement depends on these select issues.  Statutory Auditors’ 
Engagement is the DV and all other variables are IVs. For the sake of simplicity, we are taking an assumption 
that a linear relationship exists between the DV and all IVs. There is a linear relationship between DV and each 
select IV as we have assumed. Hence, we are using Multiple Linear Regression Analysis (MLRA) in order to 
ascertain such relationship. 
(a) Brief Overview of the Technique  
A generalised function of linear regression model is: Y = f (Xi, ei) 
For several variables, the model can be extended as follows: 
♦ Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 +............... βnXn+ ei 
In the above equation, Y is the dependent variable. X1, X2.... Xn are independent variables and ei is the stochastic 
disturbance term. The intercept in the above equation (α) is the average value of Y when there is no explanatory 
variable in the model. The coefficients β1, β2,.....βn are the partial regression coefficients. The estimated values of β 
represent the degree and direction of impact of IVs on DV.  
Important Conditions for conducting MLRA   
♦ The number of observations must be greater than the number of parameters to be estimated;  
♦ ei  is a random variable  and the mean of  e is zero for all Xi ; 
♦ Covariance between ei and each Xi is zero;  
♦ The independent variables are not perfectly linearly correlated (absence of Multicollinearity).  
Subject to fulfilment of the aforesaid assumptions, MLRA estimate β using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
method. The estimated value of β is used to analyse the impact of select IVs on DV. 
(b) Fulfilment of Conditions   
(i) The number of observations must be greater than the number of parameters to be estimated 
Total sample size is 601 and number of parameters to be estimated is only 7. Hence, first condition of MLRA is 
fulfilled. 
(ii) ei  is a random variable  and the mean of  e is zero for all Xi 
Mean of Un-standardised residuals (ei) for each observation comes out to be zero. It fulfils this condition. 
(iii)  Covariance between ei and each Xi is zero 
The formula of covariance between ei and Xi is as below:  
Cov (ei, Xi) = ∑   	
  
	    1	  
We have calculated covariance of each predictor variable with un-standardised residuals. The result is shown in 
Table 3.   
Table 3: Covariance between un-standardised residuals and predictor variables 
Predictor Variables Covariance with ei 
Management Influence in Appointment Procedure  .000 
Appointment by Independent Regulatory Authority  .000 
Mandatory Rotation of Auditor  .000 
Setting Maximum Limit on Total Remuneration to Statutory Auditor  .000 
Close Personal Relationship with Management Members  .000 
Provision of Non-Audit Services by Statutory Auditor .000 
Complete Prohibition of Non-Audit Services  .000 
(Source: Compilation of Primary Data using SPSS 20.0) 
It is observed that covariance between each select predictor variable and un-standardised residuals are either zero. 
Hence, this condition is met.  
(iv) The  independent variables are not  perfectly linearly correlated 
When near perfect linear relationship exist between the predictors, it is called the problem of Multicollinearity. If 
Multicollinearity is present, regression estimates cannot be distinctively computed. They become highly unstable 
and standard error gets widely exaggerated. Multicollinearity among predictor variables can be measured with 
help of following tools:  
♦ Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (r)  
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The formula for calculating this r is shown below:  
 
Where, x and y represent scores of two predictor variables and n is the sample size. If the absolute value of ‘r’ 
for any pair of predictor variables is equal to or more than .8, significant collinearity exist between them. The 
correlation matrix is shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
R V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 
V2 1.000 .452 .144 .065 .159 .187 .113 
V3 .452 1.000 .184 .161 .073 .201 .193 
V4 .144 .184 1.000 .130 .065 .063 .080 
V5 .065 .161 .130 1.000 .123 .167 .228 
V6 .159 .073 .065 .123 1.000 .079 -.002 
V7 .187 .201 .063 .167 .079 1.000 .611 
V8 .113 .193 .080 .228 -.002 .611 1.000 
(Source: Compilation of Primary Data using SPSS 20.0) 
It is seen that none of correlation coefficient is more than .8. Hence, we can infer that there is no 
Multicollinearity among predictor variables.  
♦ Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)  
Tolerance is calculated as (1-R²j) where R²j is the variance of dependent variable explained by j
th
 predictor 
variable. VIF is just the reciprocal of tolerance level i.e. VIF = 1/Tolerance.  Tolerance value less than .10; and 
VIF value more than 10 indicate severe Multicollinearity (Gujarati, Porter & Gunasekar, 2014). Tolerance level 
and VIFs for the predictor variables in the current model is shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Collinearity Statistics 
Predictor Variables Tolerance VIF 
Management Influence in Appointment Procedure  .767 1.304 
Appointment by Independent Regulatory Authority  .753 1.328 
Mandatory Rotation of Auditor  .949 1.053 
Setting Maximum Limit on Total Remuneration to Statutory 
Auditor  
.911 1.097 
Close Personal Relationship with Management Members  .953 1.049 
Provision of Non-Audit Services by Statutory Auditor .607 1.647 
Complete Prohibition of Non-Audit Services  .602 1.662 
(Source: Compilation of Primary Data using SPSS 20.0)  
The table shows that that tolerance level is more than .10 and VIFs are less than 10 for all predictor variables. So, 
we can infer that problem of Multicollinearity does not exist among predictors. 
(c) Formulation of Regression Equation  
The linear regression equation for this current study can be formulated as follows:  
V1 = Constant + β1 V2+ β2V3 + β3V4 + β4V5 + β5V6 + β6V7 + β7V8 
Where, V1 represents DV and V2 to V8 represent IVs (Refer to Section-5).  
A general formula for calculating parameter estimate using Ordinal Least Square (OLS) Method is as follows:  
 
⇒ Un-standardised βi =[ Cov (V1, Vi)÷ Var (Vi) ] 
Where, i range from 2 to 8  
The β calculated based the above formula is un-standardised (Draper & Smith, 1998). With a view to removing 
such disparity, we can also calculate standardised values of β based on following formula: 
⇒ Standardised βi = Un-standardised βi [Standard Deviation (S.D.) of Vi ÷ Standard Deviation of V1] 
The constant in the above equation can be estimated based on following formula:  
⇒ Estimated value of the constant =Mean value of V1 - ∑Un-Standardised βi × Mean score of Vi, 
Where, i range from 2 to 8 
Based on the above formulae, estimated the values of values of the parameters as shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates  
Variable 
No. 
Name of Variables Constant Regression 
Coefficient 
(Un-
Standardised) 
Regression 
Coefficients 
(Standardised) 
 Constant  2.317   
V2 Management Influence in Appointment 
Procedure  
 
-.007 -.009 
V3 Appointment by Independent Regulatory 
Authority  
 
.018 .026 
V4 Mandatory Rotation of Auditor   .030 .033 
V5 Setting Maximum Limit on Total Remuneration 
to Statutory Auditor  
 
.177 .251 
V6 Close Personal Relationship with Management 
Members  
 
-.045 -.046 
V7 Provision of Non-Audit Services by Statutory 
Auditor 
 
-.018 -.023 
V8 Complete Prohibition of Non-Audit Services   .114 .146 
 (Source: Compilation of Primary Data using SPSS 20.0) 
Value of constant and un-standardised regression coefficients as obtained from the table can be used for framing 
the linear regression equation as follows:  
V1 = 2.317 -.007V2+ .018V3 + .030V4 + .177V5 -.045V6 -.018V7 + .114V8 
Inferences  
♦ From the values of standardised regression coefficients, it is observed that Management Influence in 
Appointment Procedure, Close Personal Relationship with Management Members, and Provision of Non-
Audit Services negatively influence statutory auditors’ engagement.  
♦ On the other hand, Appointment by Independent Regulatory Authority, Mandatory Rotation of Auditor, 
Setting Maximum Limit on Total Remuneration and Complete Prohibition of Non-Audit Services by 
Statutory Auditors positively influence audit engagement.  
♦ From the magnitude of standardised regression coefficients, it is observed that maximum limit on total 
remuneration and complete prohibition of non-audit services have higher impact on statutory auditors’ 
engagement than other variables considered in this study.  
(d) Analysing Significance of Estimated Relationship  
Statistical significance of the parameter estimates is tested using t test. The considerations for the test are as 
follows:   
Hypothesis  H0: βi = 0 
H1: βi ≠ 0 
Underlying sampling distribution   t  
Test statistic (t) Un-standardised βi/ S.D. of βi 
Degree of Freedom (DF)  n-2 where n = sample size = 601 
Level of significance  5% 
Decision Rule  If probability (P-Value) of obtaining test statistic at 
defined DF is less than .05, H0 cannot be accepted and 
vice versa.  
Result of t test for each of the predictor variable is shown in Table 7.  
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Table 7: Results of t tests 
Variable 
No. 
Name of Variables βi (Un-
standard
ised) 
SD 
of βi 
Calculated 
value of t 
Sig. (P-
Value) 
Decision 
Rule 
Acceptance 
or 
Rejection 
of H0 
V2 
Management Influence in 
Appointment Procedure  -.007 .034 -.207 .836 
P 
Value >.
05 
Accepted  
V3 
Appointment by Independent 
Regulatory Authority  .018 .032 .581 .561 
P 
Value >.
05 
Accepted  
V4 
Mandatory Rotation of 
Auditor  .030 .036 .837 .403 
P 
Value >.
05 
Accepted 
V5 
Setting Maximum Limit on 
Total Remuneration to 
Statutory Auditor  
.177 .029 6.153 .000 
P Value 
<.05 
Rejected  
V6 
Close Personal Relationship 
with Management Members  -.045 .039 -1.159 .247 
P 
Value >.
05 
Accepted 
V7 
Provision of Non-Audit 
Services by Statutory Auditor -.018 .039 -.451 .652 
P 
Value >.
05 
Accepted 
V8 
Complete Prohibition of 
Non-Audit Services  
.114 .039 2.920 .004 
P Value 
<.05 
Rejected 
(Source: Compilation of Primary Data using SPSS 20.0) 
  Inferences  
♦ On the basis of the current sample, H0 is accepted for most of the issues. From this result, we can conclude 
that although in our current sample, management influence in appointment procedure, appointment by 
independent regulatory authority, mandatory rotation of auditor, and close personal relationship with 
management members and provision of non-audit services has certain amount of influence on statutory 
auditors’ engagement, from socio-economic point of view they are not very important issues in this respect.  
♦ On the basis of current sample, we cannot accept H0 for maximum limit on total remuneration and 
prohibition of non-audit services. Therefore, these two issues are really very important in governing 
statutory auditors’ engagement from socio-economic point of view.  
(e) Measuring Strength of Association  
In this segment, our main objective is to measure strength of association statutory auditors’ engagement and its 
governing audit engagement issues. The measures used for this purpose and their respective values are shown 
here:  
Measure Formula for calculation Value  
Coefficient of 
Multiple Correlation 
(R) 
♦ R = Correlation coefficient between estimated and observed 
values of DV  
♦ Estimated values of DV are obtained from observed values of 
IVs and corresponding regression coefficients. 
.320 
Coefficient of 
Multiple 
Determination (R
2
) 
R² = [Variance of Estimated Values of DV ÷ Variance of 
Observed Values of DV] 
.102 
Adjusted R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 = R
2
 adjusted by the number of predictor variables.  .092 
Inferences  
♦ The value of R shows a good positive correlation exists between observed and estimated values of DV. It 
indicates that estimated values of DV calculated based on IVs strongly influence observed values of DV. 
Therefore, IVs together have considerable influence on DV.  
♦ The value of R² and Adjusted R² suggests that a small proportion of total variance of DV is explained by 
select IVs. Therefore, we can conclude that the issues selected in this present study are not sufficiently 
explaining statutory auditors’ engagement. However, this study is based on opinion of human beings which 
is difficult to capture as stated earlier. Hence, even a small value of Adjusted R² does not render the model 
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unfit.  
(f) Fitness of the Model   
The regression model is fit, if the strength of association between DV and IVs are statistically significant. 
Statistical significance of strength of association between DV and IVs can be tested using one way ANOVA. 
The modality of the test is stated below:  
Hypothesis  H0: R² = 0 
H1: R² ≠ 0 
Underlying distribution  F Distribution  
Degree of Freedom  k-1 & n-k where n = sample size = 601 and k = number of predictor variables = 
8  
Test statistic (F) F = Mean Sum of Squares (MSS) Regression ÷ MSS Residual  
Where,  
MSS Regression = Variance of DV Explained by the Regression Equation [Total 
Sum of Squares (TSS) Regression]÷ (k-1) &  
MSS Residual = Variance of DV not Explained by the Regression Equation [TSS 
Residual] ÷  (n-k) 
Level of significance  5% 
Decision rule  If the probability (P-Value) at (7,593) degree of freedom is less than .05, H0 
cannot be accepted and vice versa.  
 The result of the test is shown in Table 8.  
Table 8: Result of one way ANOVA 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
Degree of 
freedom Mean Square F P-Value 
Decision 
Rule 
Acceptance 
or 
Rejection 
of H0 
Regression 
46.980 7 6.711 9.673 .000 
P-
Value<.05 
Rejected  
Residual 411.423 593 .694       
Total 458.403 600         
(Source: Compilation of Primary Data using SPSS 20.0) 
It is observed that H0 is rejected. It signifies that although the value of R² estimated based on current sample is 
small, strength of association between statutory auditors’ independent operation and all other explanatory 
variables is statistically significant. Therefore, we can finally conclude that select audit engagement issues 
together have considerable influence on statutory auditors’ engagement. 
 
7. Conclusions  
In recent cases of corporate failures, it has been observed that statutory auditors failed to perform an independent 
audit. In this study, we have made multiple linear regression analysis to study the impact of underlying variables 
on statutory auditors’ engagement. Our result suggests that a few variables like management influence in 
appointment procedure, close personal relationship with management members and provision of non-audit 
services negatively influence statutory auditors’ engagement and prohibits them to make independent audit. On 
the other hand, some variables including appointment made by independent regulatory authority, mandatory 
rotation, setting a maximum limit on total remuneration and complete prohibition on non-audit services could 
safeguard their engagement. Maximum limit on total remuneration and complete prohibition of non-audit 
services are the most important issues in the current study from socio-economic point of view. Hence, this study 
suggests regulatory authorities of India to consider these two proposals for future regulatory amendments. 
Though all the identified issues together do not considerably explain statutory auditors’ engagement based on 
current sample of the study, strength of association between statutory auditors’ engagement and other related 
issues are statistically significant. It indicates audit engagement issues called underlying variables selected for 
the current study are significantly governing statutory auditors’ engagement.  
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